Ukraine Desk

Kosovo at a Crossroads: Thaci's War Crimes Sentence and the Battle for Political Stability

Former Kosovo president Hashim Thaci has been sentenced to 25 years for war crimes by a Hague tribunal, even as the country faces a political deadlock over electing a new president. The twin crises threaten Kosovo’s domestic stability and its relations with NATO.

Marta Kovalenko en

In a landmark ruling on 16 September, the Hague tribunal sentenced former Kosovo president Hashim Thaci to 25 years in prison for war crimes committed during the 1990s independence war against Serbia. The conviction has plunged the country into a complex moment of reckoning, even as its parliament struggles to resolve a months-long political deadlock that threatens to trigger yet another snap election.

Thaci, 58, was found guilty of murder, illegal arrests, torture and cruel treatment during the 1998-99 war, according to the BBC. A co-founder and commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Thaci remains a hero to many Kosovars for his role in fighting for independence. War crimes prosecutors said he was responsible for killing nearly 100 people and ordering enforced disappearances. Three other former KLA commanders were tried alongside him on similar charges.

The courtroom in The Hague was the final chapter in a years-long judicial process that began with a 2020 indictment. For the families of victims, the sentence is a measure of justice. For Thaci’s supporters, it is a political verdict against a founding father of the state.

At the same time, Kosovo’s domestic politics remain in turmoil. On 13 September, parliament approved a new government led by acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, ending three months of paralysis, according to Al Jazeera. The vote passed with 62 of 120 seats, far short of the supermajority needed to elect a president. Kurti’s Vetevendosje (Self-determination) party has won three legislative elections since February 2025, but each time it has failed to secure the two-thirds majority required by the constitution for a head of state.

Kurti had struck a deal in late August with the opposition Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) to back law professor Bekim Sejdiu as president. But the deal unravelled within a day when six LDK lawmakers pledged to break party discipline and oppose the selection. Unless the 120-seat assembly can find another route, the country will face its fourth snap election in two years — a prospect that alarms Western backers.

The political crisis is rooted in Kurti’s uncompromising stance toward Serbia. His government has pursued unilateral measures in the Serb-majority north of the country, including the removal of Serb license plates and restrictions on Serbian goods. Opposition parties say these moves have alienated Kosovo’s traditional allies in NATO and the European Union, which have struggled to mediate a normalisation agreement for over a decade.

Against this backdrop, an opinion piece published in Ukrainska Pravda on 9 September posed the question: “Who should be in charge of the war?” Its full text is unavailable, but the question resonates sharply with Kosovo’s history. During the KLA insurgency, command and control was fluid; the senior political leadership, including Thaci, operated alongside field commanders. The Hague trial has effectively put the entire wartime command structure on trial, with profound implications for how Kosovans understand their independence struggle.

In strategic terms, the timing of Thaci’s sentence could not be more delicate. Kosovo’s government is weaker than it has been in years. The president, the post Thaci once held, remains unfilled almost three months after the last election. And with Serbian and Kosovan representatives still at odds over a final settlement, NATO’s KFOR peacekeeping mission remains on high alert.

The political logjam in Pristina has already delayed progress toward EU visa liberalisation and stalled the first steps of a US-facilitated normalisation agreement signed in 2023. If the country cannot resolve the presidential election, it risks a prolonged period of caretaker governance, during which difficult decisions — including how to handle Serbian demands or coordinate with international prosecutors — will be effectively frozen.

Where does the Thaci verdict leave Kosovo? For the thousands of families of those killed and disappeared, it offers a form of closure. But for the political establishment, it reopens wounds: a founding father stands convicted of war crimes, while the current prime minister faces accusations of recklessness. Kosovo’s next move — whether a workable majority for a president can be found, or whether voters head back to the polls — will determine whether the country can turn this page without tearing the book.

Sources

Part of the dossier

War Command and Control →